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Spreading Angst or Promoting Free Expression?
Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet
Joshua Spector*
The regulation of speech on the Internet is purportedly
commonplace throughout the world.1 Even if the United States takes no
immediate interest in regulating speech over the Internet, foreign
pressure is mounting for the United States to respect the laws of other
States that restrict hate speech by assisting in preventing the distribution
of hate speech to an international forum through the Internet. The U.S.
interest in maintaining First Amendment liberties is set against tension
resulting in part from the export of Neo-Nazi propaganda from the
United States to states where such speech is prohibited.2 This tension will
soon prompt countries such as France and Germany to pressure the
United States to restrict Internet speech, thereby adopting an
international standard for the prohibition of hate speech on the Internet.
In the absence of an applicable international treaty, jurisdictional
problems will blister litigation in the United States and abroad. In order
to preserve the liberty of free speech in the United States, Internet speech
must continue to benefit from the protection of the First Amendment, and
other states must look for solutions within their sovereign authority.
This note first contrasts the constitutional jurisprudence of free
speech of Germany against the United States. The contrasting practices
and doctrines are framed by a survey of international agreements on
speech and a brief discussion of hate speech in the United States. The
discussion then complicates the problems of speech by projecting it onto
the Internet.
In the United States the value of free speech is held in such high
regard that the United States Supreme Court will not allow itself to
* (J.D.) University of Miami School of Law, 2002.
'Leonard R. Sussman, Censor Dot Gov: The Internet and Press Foundation
2000, (Mayl5,2001), at
http://www.freedomhouse.orglpfs2000/sussman.html.
2 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 41 at 5, Social Science
Research Network Electronic Paper Collection (April 2001), at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=265939 (This article notes that web
sites in California have been accessed by Neo-Nazi groups in Canada, Germany,
or elsewhere).
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subject the content of speech to a balancing test. Balancing the value of
speech is inherently subjective. Entrusting un-elected judges to make
value judgments, even in the form of so-called balancing tests, guts
liberty, depriving a people of the free exchange of ideas essential to the
proper functioning of a democracy. While Germany's efforts to curtail
"hate speech" are to be commended, the tests implemented by the
German Constitutional Court ("FCC") are inconsistent with U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence. Germany's treatment of hate speech would
not be constitutional if applied in the United States-even if the United
States or state governments wished to placate or cooperate with Germany
and other concerned states, our highest court would strike down anti-hate
speech regulations based on content, save for those that would be
consistent with the tests of the U.S. Supreme Court discussed below.
The Basic Law set forth by the German Constitution describes
constitutional principles that are similar to U.S. constitutional rights.
When the text of these enumerated rights is assembled into a societal
structure and context, the respective differences between German and
U.S. jurisprudence assume the character of two different dialects of the
same language. This assertion is not to say that the language is identical
or that identical results should have been met. In fact, Germany's fourth
constitution reflects the lessons of World War II, incorporating more
explicit limitations on freedoms, particularly freedom of speech. Simply
stated, Germany prohibits "hate speech." Conversely, no government in
the United States may prohibit hate speech.
I. Prohibiting Hate Speech in Germany
In Germany, Article 1 of the Basic Law protects human dignity.
"[I]nviolability of human dignity is the highest of all the constitutional
principles, dominating all the other provisions of the Basic Law.",3 The
notion of "human dignity" effectively trumps the freedom of speech,
allowing Germany to regulate hate speech. Article 14 of the Basic Law
reads:
(1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it
shall be the duty of all state authority.
3 SABINE MIcHALowsKI & LORNA WOODs, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97
(1999), (citing Life Imprisonment Case, BverfGE 45, 187 (1977)).




(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and
of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly as enforceable law.
The FCC has stated, "the legislature must respect the inviolability of
human dignity. . . which is the highest constitutional principle."' The
FCC has defined the concept of human dignity, in part, through a
negative definition.6
Article 5 of the Basic Law provides Germans the guarantee of
freedom of speech. Article 5 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate
his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself
from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of
reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There shall
be no censorship.
(2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the
provisions of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to
inviolability of personal honor.
(3) Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free. Freedom of
teaching shall not absolve from loyalty to the constitution.
The FCC has stated that freedom of expression is "absolutely
fundamental for a liberal-democratic constitutional order because it alone
makes possible the constant intellectual debate and the contest of
opinions that is its elixir of life. In a certain way, it is the basis of any
freedom, 'matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form
of freedom.' [citation omitted]" 7 Despite the indispensable condition of
freedom of expression, it is curtailed in the interest of regulating hate
speech. The regulation of hate speech is based on the tension between
Art. 5(1), laying out the freedom of expression, and the contradictory
limits of expression imposed by "personal honor" in Art. 5(2) and the
inviolability of human dignity, Art. 1(1).
5 MICHALOWSKI, supra note 3, at 97.
6 Id. at 99, (citing Horror Film Decision, BverfGE 87, 209 (1992)) ("The FCC
sees [human dignity] as fundamental principle within the system of the basic
rights.").
7 Id., citing Lfith Decision, BverfGE 7, 199 (1958).
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In Germany, the freedom of expression is limited to the
expression of one's opinion. So long as the statement is an opinion, it is
constitutionally protected! In the Soldiers are Murderers Decision
("Soldiers"),9 the FCC held "[o]pinions. . . contain a judgment about
facts, ideas or persons.. . The guarantee exists, therefore, whether or not
the statement is rational, emotional, well-founded or unjustified, and
whether or not others think that it is useful or prejudicial, of great value
or without value."' Soldiers involved three complainants challenging the
constitutionality of their respective criminal convictions for libel." One
complainant was a teacher who, during the Gulf War, affixed a sticker to
his car with a quotation by the writer Tucholsky "Soldiers are
murderers."' 2 In the Offensive Letters Case, the FCC stated:
A differentiation according to the moral quality of opinions
would constitute a far-reaching restriction of the
comprehensive protection [of freedom of expression]. Apart
from the fact that the distinction between valuable and
valueless opinions is difficult and, in fact, often impossible to
make, in a pluralistic. society that is based on the concept of a
free democracy every opinion, even one that deviates from the
dominant view, deserves protection. This is why Art. 5(1)(1)
BL even protects degrading judgments about other persons or
certain events or conditions unless the limitations laid down in
Art. 5(2) BL apply.
13
The distinction between opinion and fact therefore becomes
essential to the expression and dissemination of unpopular ideas. The
language of the FCC in the Offensive Letters Case does not, by itself,
knock out the expression of "hate speech." In the Holocaust Denial
Case14 the FCC has stated that the subject of Art. 5(l)(1) BL are
opinions, which cannot be proved either right or wrong.' 5
8Id. at 200.
9 BverfGE 93, 266 (1995).
'oMICHALOWSKI, supra note 3, citing Soldiers at 200.
"Id. at 201.
12 id.
13 Id. at 200, citing Offensive Letters Case, BverfGE 33, 1 (1972) at 15.
14 BverfGE 90, 241 (1994).
1s MICHALOWSKI, supra note 3, at 202, citing Offensive Letters Case, BverfGE
90, 241 (1994) at 247.
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The Criminal Code of Germany goes past the Basic Law, further
restricting the freedom of speech. 16 Article 130 "imposes a sanction of a
fine or imprisonment of up to five years against any person who incites
hatred or invites violence or arbitrary acts against parts of the population,
or insults, maliciously degrades, or defames parts of the population, in a
manner likely to disturb the public peace. 17 This provision has not been
challenged on a constitutional basis, and there has been little academic
discussion, "presumably because there is a shared perception that 'acts
by private persons likely to incite racial hatred are not protected by the
right to freedom of speech"'. 8 The case law of Germany demonstrates
that hate speech or speech that is offensive to the dignity of "groups
within German society" is simply not protected by the guarantee of free
speech in the Basic Law.19
II. Hate Speech in the United States
The roots of free speech in the United States may be traced to
four main philosophical justifications. ° John Stuart Mill's utilitarian
philosophy is considered the source of the justification from the pursuit
of truth.2' Mill's philosophy proposed the pursuit of truth is a struggle of
trial and error that will lead to the truth after uninhibited discussion.22
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes imported this concept to American
constitutional jurisprudence 23 in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States.24 This justification is the dominant justification for free
16 Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media
Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 179,
201 (Winter 2001).
17 id.
s 1d. at 203.
19 Id. at 203-05.
20 For a brief discussion of the four justifications, see Michel Rosenfeld, Hate
Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, Working
Paper Series No. 41 at 5, Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper
Collection: (April, 2001)
<http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=265939>. For an extensive
discussion, Rosenfeld cites FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
21 Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 17.
2 Id.
23 Id.
24 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
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speech in the United States today, and is referred to as the "free
marketplace of ideas." 25
Freedom of speech in the United States has not been a static
barrier to the pressures of the time and political mood. Shortly after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed,
sharply curtailing the freedom of speech; during World War I (when the
initial freedom of speech cases were tried) convictions were upheld for
political speech; the fear of communism following World War II
lessened the protection of the First Amendment from the famous "clear
and present danger test" devised by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to a
test based on assessing the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
probability.26 The tests employed in assessing the constitutional
protection afforded to domestic speech have evolved over the years, and
neither of the above tests remains more controlling or influential.
The extent to which racist speech is protected has changed along
with the tests. In Beauharnais v. Illinois,2 7 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a conviction for "group libel" against the writer/publisher of a
white supremacist periodical who distributed a petition containing many
inflammatory statements about African-Americans. The Court further
held that the statements were "fighting words," a category of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment.
28
World War II and the Holocaust sparked interested in group libel
laws in the United States, just as they influenced the fourth constitution
of Germany.29 Sociologist and law professor David Riesman wrote in
support of restricting offensive racial and religious speech in a three-part
series for the Columbia Law Review, arguing that Fascism undermined
democracy by "exploiting its commitment to tolerance and free speech;
and that democracies had both a right and duty to curb this threat."30
New Jersey's state supreme court overruled a race hate law, New York
considered one, the governor of Rhode Island vetoed its bill in 1944,
Indiana passed a law in 1947, and West Virginia and Connecticut passed
marginally effective laws.3' In 1943 Massachusetts passed a group libel
law with strict fines and/or prison terms for "publishing 'any false,
25 Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 17.26 Palmer, supra note 16, at 207.
27 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
28 rd.
29 SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN




written or printed material with the intent to maliciously promote hatred
of any group of persons in the commonwealth because of race, color or
religion."'32 There were no prosecutions under the Massachusetts law.33
Congress failed to pass bills such as 1944's H.R. 2328, backed by the
American Jewish Congress, to ban hate speech literature from the mail.34
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") opposed the bill, and
attorney Max Ernst recommended instead a federal disclosure law,
revealing financing and officers of the group sponsoring the mailer.3 5
Restriction of hate speech peaked with Beauharnais; one of the
strongest supporters of the group libel law, the American Jewish
Congress, later repudiated the law, and the state of Illinois repealed the
1917 law eight years after Beauharnais.36 One commentator notes that
some civil rights groups were opposed to group libel legislation because
it posed a dangerous exception to the "seamless fabric of individual
rights" being advanced in other Supreme Court cases.37 Subsequent
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court suggest that if Beauharnais came
before the Court today, the result would be different.
The Court overturned a criminal syndicalism statute in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,38 thereby protecting the speech of a Ku Klux Klan
leader in a rally stating "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible there
might have to be some vengeance taken." The holding set forth a new
standard for "fighting words" and for free speech in general. "[A] State
[cannot] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.,
39
This test only denies protection to racist speech where there is an
imminent threat of violence.
American Neo-Nazis gained a great deal of media exposure but
little momentum from the Skokie Cases, which included the Illinois
District Court decision Collin v. Smith40 ("Collin"). In Collin the district
court held unconstitutional ordinances in a predominately Jewish
32id.
33 id.
34 Id. at 83.
351 Id. at 85-6.
36 Id. at 77.
37 Id. at 78.
38 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39 Id. at 447.
40 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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neighborhood enacted to prevent neo-Nazis from marching.41 The district
court stated that "it is better to allow those who preach racial hate to
expend their venom in rhetoric rather than to be panicked into embarking
on the dangerous course of permitting the government to decide what its
citizens may say and hear."42 One scholar identifies the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision R.A.. v. City of St. Paul4 3 as the apotheosis of the
above comment.44
In R.A. V an African-American family moved into a
predominately white neighborhood of St. Paul. Following various other
offensive incidents by various perpetrators, a white teenager placed a
burning cross on the lawn of the family. The Minnesota Supreme Court
convicted the white teenager of a misdemeanor for placing a symbol that
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment...on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.'A5 The Court held that the regulation was
unconstitutional for it discriminated on the basis of content within an
area of speech that was not protected by the First Amendment. In other
words, a regulation may not favor one form of unprotected speech over
others.
There is no per se absolute protection of speech in the United
States. Two U.S. Supreme Court Justices who purported to be
"absolutists" simply set the limits of permissible speech at speech that
was protected by the First Amendment.46 Professor John Hart Ely
suggests that such an approach is not sufficiently predictable.47 In United
States v. O'Brien, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the majority held
that the act of burning a military draft card was not protected against a
necessary ordinance requiring possession of the card; the decision set a
three-part test for the incidental regulations of speech and regulations
41 Id. at 702.
42 Id. The author agrees with these remarks and adds that the only significant
popular legacy of the Skolde Cases is in found in mainstream cinema. To wit: in
THE BLUES BROTHERS the two protagonists find their vehicle halted in order to
allow a group of neo-Nazis to exercise their court-won right to march. The
protagonists may indeed interpret the march as "fighting words" for they react
by placing their vehicle in low gear and running the demonstrators off a bridge
and into water, much to the delight of on-lookers and the duty-bound police.
" 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
44 Palmer, supra note 16, at 211.
45 505 U.S. 377 at 393.
46 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL




that did not concern content of speech.48 In another approach to assessing
speech, the Court in Cohen v. California identified the unprotected
categories of speech and narrowed their definitions.49 Ely identifies the
two different decisions as indicative of the two dominant modes of
assessing the protection of freedom of speech, referring to content-
specific regulations as specific harm tests and the remaining areas of
speech as unprotected speech.50
It is the not the identification of the two modes of assessment
that is noteworthy, but rather it is Ely's argument that the two modes
may be articulated as complementary tests.5 1 For example, the standard
for the Court to review the constitutionality of a regulation remains the
test set forth in O'Brien.52 The first prong asks whether the government
may enact the regulation, the second part questions whether the
regulation fulfills an important government interest, and the third prong
questions whether the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech.53 If the regulation is unrelated, the fourth part of the test asks
whether the suppression is no greater than is essential to advance the
government's interest.54 The fourth part of the test will apply a standard
of "no gratuitous inhibition" if the speech is non-traditional, such as flag-
burning, etc.55 The standard for the fourth part of the test will be a
"serious balancing" test if the form of speech is traditional. 6 Notice that
unlike the German system, this is the only instance where the Court will
conduct a balancing of any sort. Should the regulation fail the third prong
of the test for it is related to the suppression of free speech (it is content-
based) and the test shifts to the scheme of Cohen, where the Court should
determine whether the speech in question is part of a well-defined
category of unprotected speech. 7
48 See ELY, supra note 46; JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 173-
187 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996).49 See ELY, supra note 46, at 1-14.
50 See id. at 105-116.
511d. at 111.
52 See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 173-187 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1996).53 Id. at 174.
54 id.55Id. at 175.
56 See id. at 175-79.
57 -d.
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Scholars have certainly argued that hate speech should constitute
a category of unprotected speech.58 If speech falls into an unprotected
area, there is no balancing test or analysis of its content other than to
determine whether it is or is not within the category. But there is an
inherent test of whether a racial epithet or the like is racist enough to be
hate speech. At the risk of being trite, there may be dislike speech that
does not carry the pretextual and/or harmful dimensions of hate speech.
This junction may be considered similar to the FCC's determination of
whether some element of speech is a fact or an opinion. Perhaps the
fact/opinion test would be the necessary objective criteria for U.S. courts
to determine whether speech is dislike or hate speech. Clearly this
discussion leads to the unsatisfactory conclusion that there is no easy
answer, but if further tests are necessary to divine the protected speech
from the unprotected speech, making hate speech an unprotected
category of speech promises some radical shifts in the foundation of free
speech.
Some scholars have endeavored to identify four stages of speech
in the United States, of which we are just now entering the fourth.59 The
fourth stage results from the expansion of the "alternative discourses"
(feminist theory, critical race theory, etc.) that assert that mainstream
speech is "inherently oppressive" and a white male dominated
discourse.60 To engage and treat this condition of speech, these
alternative discourses call for the "pluralization and fragmentation of
discourse.",61 In that vein, the protection of free speech shifts to cover the
oppressed and marginalized discourses against the pressure brought to
bear on them by the hegemonic, dominant discourse.62 In the third stage,
the greatest protection for hate speech would be available, as the
protection focused on the rights of the listener. 63 The fourth stage, in
contrast, calls for suppression of hate speech, but that perspective has not
58 See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, WORDS THAT WOUND
(Westview Press 1993); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, WORDS THAT WOUND (Westview
1993).
59 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 41 at 13, Social Science








yet been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.64 In between these stages,
some scholars have argued that hate speech in the United States should
be self-regulated.65 This solution is likewise as optimistic as a snowball
in hell, but the trajectory of the pitch is on point. If end-users of the
Internet adopted state-mandated software to filter the content
downloaded from the Intemet,66 the immediate pressure on the United
States to conform to international positions on Internet hate speech
would be lessened.
I. International Agreements Applicable to the United States
Under several international agreements, it may be argued that the
United States has an affirmative duty to enact legislation prohibiting hate
speech. One such agreement is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Article 18 provides for free expression, and Article 19 calls for
freedom to express (free from interference, regardless of frontiers). This
language opens the door for so-called political hate speech. Article 29(2)
enables the exercise of rights limited by law for "morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society." Then Article 30 states
that one cannot engage in an activity to destroy any rights or freedoms.
Another such agreement is the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Article 20(2) holds forth: "Any advocacy of
64 id.
65 A. Michael Froomkin, Thirtieth Annual Administrative Law Issue
Governance of the Internet: Article Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN
to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, n. 686 ("There
is a strong sentiment in some quarters that 'industry self-regulation' should be
used to ban hate speech on the Internet." citing generally J.M. Balkin, et al.,
Filtering the Internet: A Best Practices Model, 2-10 (Sept. 15, 1999) (arguing
that self-regulation is the only effective means of controlling Internet content),
http://www.webserver.law.yale.edu/infosocietyFiltering5.rtf (on file with the
DUKE LAW JOURNAL); Bertelsmann Foundation, Self-Regulation of
InternetContent, at
<http://www.stiftung.bertelsmann.de/intemetcontent/englishldownload/Memora
ndum.pdf (1999)> (examining the need for and structure of a self-regulating
system for the control of Internet content) (on file with the DUKE LAW
JOURNAL)).
66 See J.M. Balkin, et al., Filtering the Internet: A Best Practices Model, at 2
(Information Society Project at Yale Law School, Sept. 15, 1999), available at
<http://webserver.law.yale.edu/infosociety/Filtering5.rtf> (proposing a filtering
plan; however it seems likely that hate groups, like child pornographers, would
deliberately not conform to whatever means such a plan relied on).
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national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi-
nation, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." The U.N.
Human Rights Committee interpreted this provision to mean "that
signatory states were obligated to enact legislation prohibiting hate
speech, although such laws did not necessarily have to include criminal
penalties."67 The United States signed with a set of reservations stating
that it was not bound by a provision that violated the First Amendment.68
Article 4 of the 1966 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination seeks to "condemn all
propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one color or ethnic origin,
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in
any form., 69 Further, signatories were to "adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such
discrimination." 70
The reservations of the United States in entering these treaties
demonstrate the national commitment to the protection of the First
Amendment. These reservations also predict that the United States would
not become a party to a treaty that called for the restriction of hate speech
over the Internet. The constitutional jurisprudence discussed above has
been applied to and has focused on speech over the Internet.
IV. Regulation of Internet Speech in the United States
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed free speech and the
Internet in Reno v. ACLU.71 In Reno, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down Title V of Telecommunications Act of 1996,72 known as the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"). The CDA sought, inter
alia, to reduce the exposure of minor children to pornographic materials
on the Internet.73 The Court looked at two key provisions.74 The first, 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(a), prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or
indecent messages to any recipient under eighteen years of age.75 The
6 7 
WALKER, supra note 29, at 89.
68 id.
69 Id. at 90.
70 id.
71 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
72 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
73 Reno, 521 U.S. at 857-58.
74 d. at 859.




second provision, § 223(d), prohibited the knowing sending or displaying
of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person
under 18 years of age. 6 The Court noted that the statute contained
affirmative defenses that tempered the provisions' breadth in §
223(e)(5)(A), covering those who take "good faith, reasonable, effective,
and appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited
communications.77 Me other defense covered those who restricted access
to covered material by demanding certain designated forms for proof of
age, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification code.78
Immediately after President Clinton signed the bill, on February
8, 1996, twenty plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of
§§ 223(a)(1) and 223(d).79 Following a temporary restraining order
(1) in interstate or foreign communications--. ...
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly--
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
"any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication
is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; ......
(2)knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be
used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity.. .shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both."
76 Reno, 521 U.S. at 859. The provision, U.S.C.A. 223(d) provided:
(d)Whoever--
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that
it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
77 Reno, 521 U.S. at 860.
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against enforcement of one provision of the CDA, a three-judge district
court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both of the
above-mentioned, challenged provisions?'° On the panel, Chief Judge
Sloviter acknowledged that the U.S. Government had an interest that was
"compelling" with respect to some of the material, but that the CDA's
use of the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" were, in the opinion
of the court, "inherently vague."81 Judge Sloviter also determined that the
affirmative defenses were not "technologically or economically feasible
for most providers," and rejected the contention that providers could
defend themselves against liability by "tagging" material in a manner
that enabled potential viewers to screen out unwanted transmissions.82
Similarly, Judge Buckwalter concluded that the word "indecent" in §
223(a)(1)(B) and the terms "patently offensive" and "in context" in §
223(d)(1) were too vague to be adequately enforced with respect to
constitutional protections.
The U.S. Government argued that under the Court's decision in
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,83 the CDA was constitutional as a sort
of "cyberzoning" on the Internet.84 The Court distinguished Renton,
which upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of
residential neighborhoods. The ordinance in that case was aimed at
secondary effects associated with the presence of these theaters (crime,
deteriorating property values) as opposed to the CDA which "is a
content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be
properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. ' 8s
The Court continued by distinguishing a line of cases dealing with
regulation of television, noting that many of the factors inherent in
broadcast television are not present in cyberspace. "Neither before nor
after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic foray of the
Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and
regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.,
86
The Court applied several of these factors of key importance to
the present discussion, specifically, that of the medium's "invasive"
nature. On this matter, the Court stated that "[tlhe Internet is not as
80 Id. at 862.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986).
84 Reno, 521 U.S. at 867-868.




"invasive" as radio or television,, 8 7 and looked to Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,88 wherein a company that offered pre-recorded,
sexually oriented telephone messages challenged the constitutionality of
an amendment to the Communications Act that imposed a blanket
prohibition on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages. The Court in Sable recognized that the "dial-it
medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication, i.e., turning on the radio or television and being
surprised by an indecent message is different than placing a telephone
call" (to solicit one).89 The newness or difference of the medium is
summarized by the Court in its acknowledgment that "our cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should
be applied to this medium." 90 The Court concluded:
The record demonstrates that the growth of the Intemet has
been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of
constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free
exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship. 91
Indeed, the opinion by Justice Stevens crescendos on this note of
non-interference and respect for democracy; echoes of the marketplace
of ideas, now a market breathing with globalization and pulsing at ever
faster rates of information exchange. This corpus matures almost in spite
of its various heads, like a chimera snapping back and forth, battling for
supremacy. Perhaps Justice Stevens and the majority sensed the futility
of muzzling the mouths of this thing. The Court was impressed with the
ease of access to the base technology and the swelling participation in the
exchange of information. Conversely, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion furthers the majority's observation that in 1996, either the
technology did not yet exist to enable gateways and content providers to
avail themselves of the affirmative defenses or such devices were not
effective enough to prevent the evils targeted by the CDA.
87 1d. at 869.
88 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
89 Reno 521 U.S. at 870, citing Sable 492 U.S. at 127-28.
90 Id. at 870.
91Id. at 885.
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Just as in Reno v. ACLU, the problem of regulating speech over
the Internet with technology continues to be a boogey solution today.
The idea that content of speech may be regulated up to a standard of
usage and exposure that is established by available technology is a
boogey. It is an illusion of restraint and an unfixed barricade against the
enforcement of Internet speech regulations that, save some purportedly
effective and convenient software, would be unconstitutional. To adopt
standards of content regulation that are bounded by and set to an
evolving technological standard is not a suitable substitute to time, place,
and manner regulations such as the identification card that demonstrates
age and therefore allow or denies access. Rather, a standard for
permissible Internet speech must be the standard for speech generally.
Reliance on software and technology can only prove to be uneven,
leading to irregular or ambivalent guidelines by which Internet speakers
must police their own expression. The technology standard would have a
chilling effect on speech, and would splinter the pathways of exchange
over the Internet.
The concept of a technology standard is derived from arguments
put forth by the U.S. Government in Reno v. ACLU and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. The technology standard is formed or
found in the viewer-side computer unit. The boundary or filter may take
the form of a software program that screens particular sites on the World
Wide Web, for example, by search terms. Other devices may be set on
the content providers' side, such as credit card verification to establish an
age of eighteen years or more or a paying subscription to enable access.
It may be argued that the U.S. Supreme Court realized that although
every new media has a different set of factors that define its usage and
relationship to the freedoms of the First Amendment,92 the court saw the
futility in tying those precious freedoms to the shifting silicon of a
technology standard.
The comparative latitude of U.S. jurisprudence in regard to
speech contributed to the foresight of the Court in Reno v. ACLU. Such
an outcome and perspective was different from the Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Paris decision when Yahoo!, Inc. was put on trial in France
for allowing Internet users in France to access and conceivably purchase
Nazi memorabilia from auctions that were transacted through Yahoo!,
Inc.'s U.S. servers.93 This situation is distinguishable in that in Reno v.
ACLU, the concern was how to prevent minors from accessing the





Yahoo! cases, authorities in France (and Germany) were seeking to
enforce laws that did strive for blanket enforcement.
A. Regulation of Internet Hate Speech Based in the United
States
In Reno v. ACLU the U.S. Supreme Court elected not to institute
a new test for unprotected speech on the Internet. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has gone one step further in assigning the traditional
free speech jurisprudence to speech on the Internet in Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists. 94 In that case, the American Coalition of Life Activists
("ACLA") compiled a series of dossiers on doctors, abortion clinic
workers, politicians, judges and abortion rights supporters termed the
"Nuremberg Files" to be used in a war crimes style trial once popular
opinion turned against abortion rights.95 One activist received the files
and posted the information on a web site. 6 The site listed names of
doctors and other persons who provided or supported abortion, and
marked the names of those already victimized by anti-abortion terrorists
by striking through the names of those murdered and graying-out the
names of those wounded.97 A poster that preceded the web site had
information about a particular doctor and offered $500 to the ACLA
organization that successfully persuaded the doctor to stop performing
abortions.98
In response to the web site, a group of doctors sued ACLA and
another organization, and twelve activists, alleging, inter alia, that the
defendants' speech had harmed them.99 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis with a comparison to the acts of Patriots intimidating the
Loyalists, and John Brown and the abolitionists' violent actions to free
slaves.'00 The court identified the test as one of whether the speech in
question constituted a "true threat." Looking to Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
court noted that "[p]olitical speech may not be punished just because it
makes it more likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time
94 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition
of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
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in the future by an unrelated party."'O' Under Brandenburg, the
requirement is that the speech is capable of "producing imminent lawless
action."' 02 Applying this analysis to the language of the web site here, the
court held that while it no doubt frightened the doctors, the
"constitutional question" inquired into the source of the fear. 03 The
standard demanded that if the defendants had foreseen that the doctors
would have perceived a threat in the speech, it would then be unprotected
speech.' 4 Speech made in a public context is afforded greater protection
than direct speech between persons because where the speech allegedly
makes a threat, the public speech is less likely to be an actual threat than
hyperbole or the like.'05 Furthermore, there is an interest in not
interfering with the normal channels of public speech, of which the
Internet is now a major component.1
6
As a standard for comparison, the Ninth Circuit was able to look
to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in NAACP V Claiborne Hardware
Co.10 7 where the NAACP organized a boycott of white-owned businesses
and boycott supporters took the names of black patrons who disregarded
the boycott.'08 The names of these people were read at public meetings
and published in a newspaper, and sporadic acts of violence against these
people followed. Charles Evers, a boycott organizer, stated at one rally,
"If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn neck."'1 9 The U.S. Supreme Court found that Evers'
words, despite being an express call for violence, were quintessentially
political statements made at a public rally (rather than direct threats to
certain persons)."0 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants'
speech on the Internet was protected."' The aggressive and hateful
language of hate groups on the Internet would likewise enjoy the
protection of this test.
101 1d.
102 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 at 447.
'03 Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d 1007, at printed page 11.
104 Id. at printed page 11, citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d
1262, 1265 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).
105 Planned Parenthood at 13; see McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955
F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1990).
106 Particularly the World Wide Web where web sites are posted and viewed.
See Reno, 521 U.S. 844.107 NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
108 See id.
109 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 902.
"0 Id. at 928-29.
111 Planned Parenthood, at printed page 14.
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Planned Parenthood answers a question that Reno v. ACLU did
not need address: whether the protections of the First Amendment, and
the corresponding tests that American constitutional jurisprudence has
fashioned to outline them, still apply to Internet speech. Neither Reno v.
ACLU or Planned Parenthood directly address issues regarding the
international dimension that Internet speech assumes.
B. The Yahoo! Cases
Yahoo, Inc. ("Yahoo") has been involved in litigation in both
Europe and the United States for hosting hate speech items on its auction
sites. In particular, Yahoo's case demonstrates the straining of traditional
doctrines of jurisdiction in the context of Internet commerce between the
United States and France. The litigation to this point has been domestic,
with the initial prosecution in a Paris court, followed by Yahoo's filing
for an injunction in California.
Yahoo had experienced investigations for several acts of hosting
the auction of alleged articles of hate speech. In November of 2000,
German prosecutors investigated the local Yahoo subsidiary under the
belief that the auction service had sold copies of Adolf Hitler's
autobiography, Mein Kampf, which is restricted in Germany.1 2 This
investigation followed the order from the Paris court by one week, and a
Japanese raid on Yahoo's Tokyo office for the sale of child-pornography
videos by one day.' 13 In response to the German investigation, Yahoo
commented, "[T]he company distances itself from Nazi philosophy... On
the German Yahoo website, 90,000 objects are offered. As soon as
Yahoo gets information that illegal products are included, it removes
them."' 1 4 The Yahoo auction system is one that moves from user to user,
the company does not conduct the transaction, and Yahoo forbids
auctions of "any item that is illegal to sell under any applicable law,
statute, ordinance or regulation."' 15 In 1999, large online book vendors
Amazon.com, Barnesandnoble.com and Bertelsmann's BOL all removed
Mein Kampf from their online sales to German customers. 6 Auction
sites, however, provide a different and more complex set of problems for
administrating services. Yahoo seems to be responsive to the public
policy concerns of the consumers' countries. Yet Yahoo, in contrast to
112 Bamaby Page, Germany Investigates Yahoo's Nazi Auctions, CMP
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the French court, does not believe that it can monitor and then effectively
block the sale-by-auction of hate speech articles to a degree that will both
satisfy the courts of France and other concerned states sufficient to avoid
prosecution in the offended state.
Earlier this year, a German court in Munich made the decision
not to prosecute Yahoo's German subsidiary for hosting an online
auction of Mein Kampf in 2000.117 One prosecutor noted "We finally
decided that Yahoo was only a supplier of internet [sic] services and not
responsible for their content."' 8 While the decision by the Munich
prosecutor was assuredly of great relief to Yahoo, the distinction drawn
between a supplier of Internet services and a producer of content is but a
tenuous foothold for Yahoo and other Internet portals or auction sites in
the face of mounting international litigation.
On or about April 5, 2000, Yahoo received a letter from La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme ("LICRA") stating, "unless
you cease presenting Nazi objects for sale [on the U.S. Auction Site]
within 8 days, we shall size [sic] the competent jurisdiction to force your
company to abide by [French] law."119 LICRA then utilized the United
States Marshal's Office to serve process on Yahoo in California, and
filed civil complaints against Yahoo in the Tribunal de Grande Instance
of Paris (the "Tribunal"), alleging violation of a French criminal
statute120 that bars the public display in France of Nazi-related "uniforms,
insignia or emblems" (the "Nazi Symbols Act").121 The Tribunal issued
an order on May 22, 2000 directing Yahoo to "take all necessary
measures" to "dissuade and render impossible" any access via
"yahoo.com" by Internet users in France to, the Yahoo auctions
displaying Nazi materials.122 The Tribunal reaffirmed the May 22 order:
[D]irect[ing] Yahoo!, inter alia, to 1) re-engineer its content servers in
the United States and elsewhere to enable them to recognize French
Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses and block access to Nazi material by
end-users assigned such IP addresses; 2) require end-users with
"ambiguous" IP addresses to provide Yahoo! with a declaration of
nationality when they arrive at Yahoo!'s home page or when they initiate
117 Yahoo Not Responsible for 'Mein Kampf' Sales: German Court, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRsSSE, March 26, 2001.
118Id.
119 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et, L'Antisemitisme, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7565, 1172 (N.D.Cal. 2001).
120 See Le Nouveau Code Penal Art. R.645-2.
121 Yahoo, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7565, 1172.
2 Id. at 1172, 1173.
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any search using the word "Nazi"; and 3) comply with the Order within
three (3) months or face a penalty of 100,000 Francs (approximately U.S.
$ 13,300) for each day of non-compliance.123
The Tribunal denied LICRA's request for the Tribunal to enforce
the order or impose the penalties set against Yahoo against Yahoo!
France. 24 LICRA then employed the U.S. Marshal's Office again in
order to serve the Tribunal's order on Yahoo in California.125 Yahoo
brought the action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California seeking a declaration that the order of the Tribunal is
unenforceable in the United States "because it contravenes the
Constitution and laws of the United States.' 26 In turn, LICRA and the
second defendant, L'Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France ("UEJF"),
moved for dismissal of Yahoo's action on the ground that district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them.127
As a matter of U.S. jurisprudence, it is interesting to note that the
District Court in California considered the jurisdictional dimension of
whether the case presented a "case or controversy" ripe for
adjudication.128 The court observed "[LICRA and UEJF] have not yet
sought to enforce the French Order in the United States, the Court
concludes that, as is discussed in more detail below, [Yahoo] nonetheless
faces immediate and ongoing consequences because of its refusal to
comply with that Order. 129 The court foresaw that Yahoo, without a
determination of whether the Tribunal's order was enforceable in the
United States, was faced with the choice of either facing the daily
accumulation of penalties against it, subject to an unpredictable legal
outcome if LICRA and UEJF sought to enforce the order in the United
States.130 The court recognized that the case was indeed ripe for
adjudication as "a classic example of a situation in which declaratory
relief would clarify the present and ongoing rights and obligations of the
,,131parties.
The judgment of the Tribunal called for Yahoo to "dissuade and
render impossible" the ability of Internet users in France to access sales
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of Nazi articles on any auction service that is hosted by Yahoo. The
Tribunal, via Judge Jean-Jacques Gomez, declared that because Yahoo
allowed Internet users in France to view the Nazi articles, an actionable
harm had been suffered in France.133 On July 24, 2000, representatives
for Yahoo told the court that it was technically impossible for the
company to block French Internet users from the U.S.-based Yahoo.com
auction site.
134
C. The Future of Internet Speech (From the United States)
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU,
Professor Lessig argued that U.S. courts would be faced with situations
where judges may be compelled to act against the will of the legislature,
and the lower courts must be prepared to rule against legislation, like the
CDA, that has a popular and important thrust, but leans up against or
battles the protections of the U.S. Constitution.
35
Confronting the International Marketplace of Ideas
The U.S. position on free speech would not be fit for a fledgling
democracy. 136 In fact, the participation of the United States in the Allies'
setting up the restricted post-war German press 137 demonstrates a
practice not consistent with constitutional rights enjoyed by the press
here. Conversely, the laws of other states, including those of our Western
allies, should not be allowed to stifle the freedoms defended in the
United States. The Internet presents real and immediate problems, yet it
should not usher in a new standard for free speech. The United States has
reserved the right to protect free speech above its obligations to
international treaties and agreements. For now, the optimistic notion that
the truth will defeat falsehood and hate speech continues, gingerly, into
the amplified forum of the Internet. Proponents of Internet speech
regulation are right to call attention to powers and currents oppressive to
132 Carl S. Kaplan, French Nazi Memorabilia Case Presents Jurisdiction
Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2000.
133 Id.
134 id.
135 See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyperspace, 45 EMORY
L.J. 869 (Summer 1996).
136 See Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media
Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 179
(Winter 2001).
137 Id. at 197-201.
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truth over the Internet, such as barriers to access, politically-biased
filtering, and the simple noise and vast scope of information.
States may still regulate hate speech without waking the
myrmidon of international laws and treaties. By putting the onus on end-
users of the Internet, rather than private entities in foreign, sovereign
states, the jurisdictional problems presented by the Yahoo cases are
avoided, and no pressure is brought to bear on states such as the United
States, that recognize a greater degree of freedom of speech over the
Internet. Three members of the Information Society Project at Yale Law
School set forth such a plan in 1999, which stated that a "general
international treaty on Internet content is highly unlikely, given the wide
cultural diversity of the planet and the need for near universal
participation....,13' Furthermore, the United States, given its reluctance
to cede the freedom of speech to any international agreement, would not
become a party to any sort of agreement that would accomplish the ends
sought by German and French authorities. If so-called "end-user"
solutions are not pursued, the problems of the Yahoo cases will be seen
more often, straining international trade, international relations, and
deterioration of free speech in the United States. The Internet has already
become a vital and accessible forum for a speech, an electronic
marketplace of ideas. If Internet speech from the United States does not
continue to benefit from the same protection under the First Amendment
as traditional speech, citizens of the United States will have lost the most
important pair of lungs that could breathe life into the freedom of speech
in the twenty-first century.
131 J.M. Baltdn, et al., Filtering the Internet: A Best Practices Model, at 2
(Information Society Project at Yale Law School, Sept. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.webserver.law.yale.edu/infosociety/Filtering5 .rtf.
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